Is This 1973?

The 2026 oil shock keeps being compared to the one that began a decade of inflation. On the oil itself the comparison holds better than you might expect. On nearly everything that turned the 1973 shock into the 1970s, it doesn't.

The claim

Why everything costs 30% more calls this year's inflation "a supply shock, closer to 1973 than to 2021." The second half is easy to defend: in 2021 too much money was chasing too few goods, and in 2026 money growth is ordinary and the problem is a war that cut off oil. The first half deserves a closer look, because 1973 is shorthand for a decade most Americans would not want to repeat: inflation in double digits twice, three recessions in nine years, and mortgage rates that peaked above 18% in 1981.

A useful comparison asks two questions. Was the shock as big? And are the things that turned the 1973 shock into the 1970s still in place?

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The shock

Then. On October 19, 1973, during the Arab-Israeli war, Arab oil producers embargoed the United States and cut production; the embargo was lifted in March 1974. The price of oil on world markets went from $2.90 a barrel before the embargo to $11.65 in January 1974. The posted price of West Texas crude, $3.56 a barrel through 1971 and 1972, went to $4.31 in August 1973 and $10.11 in January 1974. In today's dollars that is a jump from about $31 to $73 in a single month.

Now. After the strikes on Iran on February 28, West Texas crude went from $64.51 a barrel in February to $102.13 in May, a rise of about 58%, and was $97.31 in September. In today's dollars, that is higher than anything in 1973–74: about $97 against $73. The 1979–80 shock and 2008 went higher still, to about $164 and $207 a barrel in today's dollars.

So on the size of the shock, 2026 is in the same family. Oil roughly quadrupled on world markets in 1973–74; in 2026 it rose by more than half, from a higher starting point.

Inflation and core inflation, with crude oil in today's dollars underneath. The 1973–74 shock more than doubled the real price of oil and was followed by a decade of high inflation; 2026's shock reached a higher real price, so far with core inflation near 2.6%. Full chart and context →

What turned 1973 into the 1970s

Oil was the spark. Economists still argue about how much of the fire it was, which is the first argument below. The conditions it landed in are not in dispute.

Inflation was already high and rising. CPI inflation had averaged about 4.6% a year from 1968 to 1972, despite wage and price controls in place from 1971. It was 3.6% in January 1973 and 8.1% by October, the month the embargo began, with food prices up 20% over 1973. Core inflation, which leaves out food and energy, was already 4.3% in October 1973. In 2026 the shock landed on core inflation of 2.5%, which had been falling for two years, from 3.4% in 2024.

Wages were wired to prices. In 1973 about one worker in four belonged to a union, and by 1976, 61% of workers under major union contracts had cost-of-living clauses that raised pay automatically with prices. In 1974 average hourly pay rose about 8%, and it kept rising about 7–8% a year for the rest of the decade. Today one worker in ten belongs to a union, and cost-of-living clauses had already fallen to 22% of major contracts by 1995, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped counting them. In September 2026 pay was rising 3.3%, slower than prices.

The Fed put jobs first. Arthur Burns's Fed raised its rate to almost 13% by July 1974, then cut it to about 5.5% by June 1975, with core inflation still near 10%: a real interest rate of about minus 4%. Burns later said full employment had been the first priority of the public and the government, and an essay on the Federal Reserve's history site concludes that when the two halves of its mandate conflicted, jobs won. In 2026 the Fed raised its rate in September, and its rate is about 1.2 points above core inflation.

People came to expect inflation. The Michigan survey's monthly series begins in 1978, when households expected prices to rise about 5–6% over the following year; by January 1980 they expected 10.4%. In 2026 the same survey's one-year expectation rose to 4.6% in September, while the bond market's five-year inflation expectation stayed between 2.3% and 2.4%, a little above its average of 2.1% over the last decade.

The economy ran on oil, much of it imported. In 1973 net imports supplied about 35% of the oil the United States used. In 2025 it exported 2.8 million barrels a day more than it imported. The economy is nearly four times as large in real terms as in 1973 but uses only about 20% more oil, so each dollar of output takes less than a third as much. Energy took about 7% of consumer spending in 1974 and 9% in 1980, against about 4% in 2026.

Where the comparison breaks

The analogy works for the shock and fails for the mechanism. The 1973 shock hit an economy that was already overheating, with wages indexed to prices, a central bank that cut rates with inflation near 10%, and a country importing a third of its oil. The 2026 shock hit an economy with core inflation near 2.5%, few indexed wages, a central bank raising rates into a soft job market, and a country that exports more petroleum than it imports.

It also breaks in the other direction. A net exporter still pays the world price at the pump, so households feel the shock much as they did then, while more of what they pay goes to producers at home rather than abroad. And 1973 was not one shock but the first of several: the 1979 revolution in Iran more than doubled prices again. Whether 2026 is a single event depends on a war, not on economics.

What people argue about

Whether oil caused the 1970s. One side: the inflation peaks of 1973–74 and 1979–80 were driven by supply shocks, food, energy and the end of price controls, and Alan Blinder and Jeremy Rudd, revisiting the evidence in 2008, found that this classic explanation "holds up very well." The other: Robert Barsky and Lutz Kilian argued in 2001 that monetary policy, more than oil, was behind the decade's stagflation, and that easy money helped push up commodity prices before the embargo. A third view sits between them: Olivier Blanchard and Jordi Galí found that oil shocks since the 1980s have done far less damage because oil matters less to production, wages adjust more flexibly, central banks are more credible, and, in part, because of luck.

Whether the Fed is repeating Burns's mistake, or the opposite one. One side: the lesson of the 1970s is that a central bank that waits for an oil shock to pass lets expectations drift, and household expectations have already jumped; two Fed members voted for another increase in October. The other: an oil shock raises prices and slows the economy at the same time, so raising rates adds a second blow to jobs while doing nothing about oil, and with core inflation at 2.6% and the bond market's expectations steady, the case for more increases is weak. Supply vs. demand has the general form of this argument.

Whether wages will catch up. One side: with unemployment at 4.2%, workers still have some leverage, real pay has been falling since April, and catch-up raises in 2027 could keep services inflation up, the 1970s mechanism in slow motion. The other: with one worker in ten in a union, almost no automatic cost-of-living clauses and hiring this slow, there is no channel for a spiral, and pay growth has slowed this year, from 3.7% in February to 3.3% in September. Hourly pay has the measures both sides read.

See also

Sources

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