Tariffs, and Who Pays

A tariff is collected from the American company that imports the goods. Who ends up paying it, that company, its customers or the foreign seller, depends on who can walk away, and the evidence from 2018 and 2025 points mostly in one direction.

In one sentence

A tariff is a tax on imported goods, paid to U.S. Customs by the importer, usually an American business, when the goods enter the country; who ends up bearing it depends on how easily each party can go elsewhere.

New articles and charts arrive in one short email on Monday mornings. Get the weekly digest

The analogy

A toll on a bridge. The trucking company pays it at the booth, every crossing. Whether the cost then turns up in the price at the store, comes out of the trucker's margin, or pushes the factory on the far bank to cut its price depends on who has another way across. If there is a second bridge, a supplier in a country without the toll, traffic moves there and the toll raises less money. If there is a ferry, a producer on this side of the river, it can raise its own prices under cover of the toll. If there is no other way across at all, the people who need what's on the far side pay.

How it reaches your kitchen table

At the register, slowly. Importers pay the tariff when the goods arrive, but most did not raise their prices by the full amount right away; they absorbed some of it, spread it out, or waited to see whether it would last. Using high-frequency price data from U.S. retailers, Alberto Cavallo, Paola Llamas and Franco Vazquez found that by September 2025 store prices of imported goods had risen about twice as much as prices of domestic goods, but only by about a fifth of the tariff. By their estimate, tariffs had added about 0.7 percentage point to consumer prices by then. The Budget Lab at Yale estimates that once prices fully adjust, the tariffs in place in August 2026 will cost the average household about $1,100 a year.

On things made here. A tariff also lets American producers raise their own prices without losing customers to imports: the ferry. When the United States put tariffs on imported washing machines in 2018, washer prices rose nearly 12%, and so did prices of dryers, which weren't tariffed but are usually bought with washers. The tariffs did bring washer production and jobs to the United States, at a cost to buyers of about $1.5 billion a year, more than $800,000 for each job created.

In your taxes. A tariff is a tax, and since 2025 a large one by modern standards. Customs duties brought in $195 billion in fiscal 2025, about two and a half times as much as the year before. After the Supreme Court ruling, about $130 billion went back to importers as refunds, and customs duties came to $172 billion in fiscal 2026, about 3% of federal revenue. Refunds go to the company that paid at the border, not to the shoppers who paid higher prices.

What happened in 2025 and 2026

Most of the 2025 tariffs were imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a 1977 law that lets the president regulate imports during a declared national emergency. The first, from February and March, were on Canada, Mexico and China, over illegal immigration and drugs. The second, announced on April 2, put a 10% tariff on goods from nearly every country, with higher "reciprocal" rates of up to 41% for many of them from August, after a pause and a series of deals: 15% on most goods from the European Union, Japan and South Korea, 10% from the United Kingdom. A separate set came under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows tariffs on imports that threaten national security: steel and aluminum, raised to 50% in June 2025, cars and parts at 25% for most countries, and copper, lumber and trucks.

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources v. Trump that the emergency law does not authorize tariffs. The emergency tariffs ended four days later and were replaced the same day by a 10% surcharge on most imports under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows up to 15% for up to 150 days. A rise to 15% was announced but never put into effect. Refunds of the emergency tariffs began in May.

When the surcharge expired on July 24, tariffs of 10% or 12.5% on goods from 60 economies took its place, imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act after investigations into whether those economies ban imports made with forced labor. The national-security tariffs were not part of the case and remain. On August 22, after trade talks broke down, a 50% tariff on about $20 billion of Canadian goods took effect, the first ever imposed under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which allows tariffs on countries that discriminate against American goods. Canada answered with tariffs of its own from September 8.

How to read the effective rate

The rates in the news are list prices: 10% on this, 50% on that, with exemptions, deals and exceptions that change month to month. The effective rate is what was actually collected: customs duties divided by the value of goods imported. It captures exemptions and the shift toward goods and countries with lower rates. It misses what the tariff did to the prices of goods that weren't taxed, and it can understate a tariff that works, because a tariff high enough to stop an import collects nothing on it.

By that measure the rate was 2.7% at the end of 2024, about where it had been since the 2018–19 tariffs. It rose to 8.3% in the second quarter of 2025, and 11.3% in the fourth, the highest in the Commerce Department series, which begins in 1959. After the Supreme Court ruling it fell to 6.8% in the third quarter of 2026, still the highest since 1975. Customs duties ran at an annual rate of $367 billion at the end of 2025, against $89 billion a year earlier. Rates on the books run higher: the Budget Lab at Yale, which averages the tariff rates in law across imports, put that figure at 11.0% in August 2026. Part of the gap is the shift the tariffs cause, as buyers move toward goods and countries with lower rates.

The trade balance, with the effective tariff rate underneath: customs duties as a share of goods imported, quarterly. The deficit hit a record in March 2025 as importers rushed goods in ahead of the tariffs, narrowed for the rest of the year and widened again in 2026. The rate drifted below 2% in the 2000s, ticked up with the 2018–19 tariffs, jumped in 2025 and fell back after the Supreme Court ruling. Full chart and context →

Where the analogy breaks

A bridge stays where it is; supply chains move. Real imports from China fell 28% in 2025 while imports from the rest of the world rose, and China's share of U.S. goods imports, 22% before the 2018 tariffs, was down to 9% by the end of 2025, with Vietnam, Taiwan and Mexico gaining most of what China lost. That is the second bridge: the goods still come, from wherever the toll is lower, and the toll collects less.

The exchange rate is a second toll that moves on its own. In theory a tariff should push the dollar up, because Americans buy less from abroad, and a stronger dollar makes imports cheaper, handing part of the cost back to foreign sellers. Stephen Miran, who became chair of the president's Council of Economic Advisers in 2025, argued that this is what happened in 2018–19, when the dollar rose by almost as much as the tariff on Chinese goods. In 2025 the dollar fell instead, by about 7% against a broad basket of currencies between January and December, which made imports dearer on top of the tariffs. And a toll that is announced, paused, raised, struck down and replaced in little more than a year is not a toll anyone can plan around, which is a cost of its own.

What people argue about

Who pays. One side: a buyer as large as the United States has bargaining power, and foreign producers who depend on American customers will cut their prices, or see their currencies fall, rather than lose the business. In July 2025 the Council of Economic Advisers found that prices of imported goods in the consumer price indexes had slipped since December even as tariffs rose, and in February 2026 Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, faulted a New York Fed study for looking at prices rather than at how much less Americans were importing. The other: that study, by Mary Amiti and three coauthors, found that foreign sellers had cut their prices by only about a tenth of the tariff, leaving nearly 90% of the cost on U.S. companies and consumers; CBO's estimates assume foreign exporters absorb 5%; and studies of the 2018–19 tariffs found nearly all of the cost fell on American buyers. Import prices before tariffs, which would fall if foreign sellers were paying, rose about 7% from January 2025 to September 2026, though the weaker dollar accounts for part of that. Part of the disagreement is over what to measure: prices at the border, which show who paid the tariff; prices at the store, which show how much of it has reached shoppers so far; or how much less the country imports, which shows what foreign producers lost.

Whether tariffs bring factories back. One side: decades of trade deficits hollowed out American manufacturing, the White House argued when it announced the April 2025 tariffs, and tariffs give companies a reason to make goods here rather than import them. It counts more than $11 trillion in investment commitments since then. Factory output was about 4% higher in September 2026 than in January 2025, and manufacturing employment rose by 72,000 in the first nine months of 2026, the figure the White House cites. Factories take years to build, so the full test is still ahead. The other: manufacturing employment fell by about 110,000 in 2025, so September 2026 was still about 20,000 jobs below January 2025; commitments are not spending, and spending on factory construction was about 28% lower in August 2026 than in January 2025; and many tariffs fall on steel, aluminum, copper and parts that American factories use, raising their costs. After the 2018–19 tariffs, Fed economists Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce found that the industries most exposed to them lost jobs relative to others, because higher input costs and other countries' retaliation outweighed the protection.

Whether tariffs can raise serious money. One side: customs duties brought in a record $195 billion in fiscal 2025, and CBO estimated in November 2025 that the tariffs then in place, if they lasted, would cut deficits by $3.0 trillion from 2025 to 2035, counting lower interest costs; the Budget Lab at Yale puts the revenue from the tariffs in place in August 2026 at about $1.9 trillion over ten years. The other: revenue that rests on emergency powers can be ordered returned, and about $130 billion was; customs duties fell to $172 billion in fiscal 2026, about 3% of federal revenue, in a year with a $2.0 trillion deficit. And the goals pull against each other: a tariff raises the most money when imports keep coming, and the least when it succeeds in bringing production home.

See also

Sources

The weekly digest

One email on Monday mornings: the week's new articles and charts, the numbers that moved most, and what comes out in the week ahead. No ads, and no tracking of opens or clicks.

Past issuesHow addresses are kept